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THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD VOLUME OF HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION," BY F.
LOUIS SOLDAN.

III.—*The Divine Idea in the Church as the Realm of the Holy Spirit.*

3. This [process], however, has also assumed phenomenal existence; it stands in relationship to the subject. It exists for the subject, and its relations to it are no less essential. The subject is to be a citizen of the kingdom of God.

This [postulate], that the subject is to become himself a child of God, implies that the reconciliation in and for itself has been consummated in the divine idea, and that it thereupon has also appeared [as an external phenomenon], and that truth has become a certainty to man. This certitude is the phenomenon: it is the idea as it presents itself to consciousness in the mode of phenomenality.

The relation of the subject to this truth is this: the subject arrives at this conscious unity, it renders itself worthy of it, it produces it in itself, and is [thus] filled with the divine spirit.

This is accomplished by self-mediation, and this mediation consists in the possession of this faith. For the faith is the truth, the presupposition that in and for itself the conciliation has surely been accomplished. Only through the belief that this conciliation has been accomplished in and for itself; surely, the subject becomes able to, and can, place itself within this unity. This mediation is absolutely necessary.

In the state of beatitude engendered by this thought, the difficulty is annulled which was immediately involved in the fact that the relation of the Church to this idea is a relation of single, particular subjects to the idea; but this difficulty is annulled in this truth itself.

To state it more explicitly: The difficulty is, that the subject is different from the divine spirit; in this appears the finitude of the subject. This is annulled, and it is annulled by the circumstance that God looks at the heart of man, at the substantial will,

at the innermost, all-comprehending subjectivity of man, at his internal, true, and earnest will.

Besides this internal will, and differing from this internal substantial reality, there is found in man his externality, his defect—the fact that he may commit errors, that he may exist in a manner which is not adequate to his internal substantial essence, to this substantial, essential internality.

Externality, however—alienation, finitude, or imperfection as it particularizes itself further—is reduced to an unessential element, and is cognized as such. For in the idea the alienation of the Son is not a true, essential, permanent, absolute, but a transitory, vanishing phase.

This is the concept of the Church in general. It is the idea which in this respect is the process of the subject in and for itself, since the subject has been received into the spirit, and is spiritual—whereby the spirit of God dwells in it. This, its pure self-consciousness, is at the same time the consciousness of truth, and this pure self-consciousness, which knows and wills the truth, is indeed the divine spirit inherent in it. This self-consciousness, moreover, expressed as faith that rests upon spirit—that is to say, upon a mediation which annuls all finite mediation—is the faith which is wrought by God.

(b) The Realization of the Communion [of Worshippers]. The realized communion [of worshippers] is what we call in general the Church. This is no longer the rise of the communion [of worshippers], but the existing communion which also sustains itself.

The existence of the communion consists in its perpetual, eternal Becoming, which is based on the fact that it is the nature of spirit to cognize itself eternally, to pour itself out in the finite spark of individual consciousness, and then to gather itself out of this finitude and comprehend itself again, since there arises in the finite consciousness the cognition of its essence, and with it the divine self-consciousness. Out of the fermentation of finitude, which wells up in foam and froth, spirit rises like a perfume.

In the existing communion the Church is the general instrumentality by means of which the subjects arrive at truth, by which they acquire the truth. By it the Holy Ghost becomes real and present, and finds its abode in them, and by it the truth is in

them. By it they are in the enjoyment and the realization of the truth, of spirit, since as subjects they are the realizing agents of spirit.

The universal of the Church is, that the truth is here presupposed, not as it was at the beginning, when the Holy Ghost had just been poured out or called forth, but rather that the truth appears as present and existing truth. This is for the subject a different mode of beginning.

1. This truth, which is thus presupposed and thus exists, is the doctrine or the dogma of the Church, the doctrine or dogma of faith, and this content we know; in one word, it is the dogma of reconciliation [of atonement]. The point is no longer that an individual person is elevated to absolute significance by the pouring out of the Holy Ghost and its proclamation, but rather that this significance is a known and acknowledged one.

It is the absolute capability of the subject to take part in the truth as well in himself as objectively, to arrive at truth, to be in the truth, to attain consciousness of the same. This consciousness of the dogma is here presupposed, it exists.

It is clear that a dogma is necessary, and also that in the existence of a communion of worshippers the dogma is already completed. It is this dogma which is represented in the form of an image-concept, and this is a content in which in and for itself there is consummated and exhibited what shall be produced in the individual as such.

Thus, as a presupposition which is complete in its elements only, the Church can find its growth and development in the communion of worshippers alone. The spirit which is poured out is but the beginning, is incipient, is the impulse. The communion [the Church] is the consciousness of this spirit, is the expression of what the spirit has found and of what it has been struck with, namely, of the truth that Christ exists for the spirit. Whether the communion of worshippers expresses its consciousness on the basis of a written document or record, or whether it links its self-determinations to tradition, is not an essential difference; the principal point is that, by the spirit inherently present in it, it is infinite power and authority for the continuation and promotion of its doctrine and dogma. This authorization proves itself in the two distinct cases to which allusion has just been made. The

expounding of a fundamental document or writ is in itself cognition, and develops into new determinations ; and, although tradition begins with something given or presupposed, tradition is in its historical growth essentially an establishment [of dogmas]. Thus the dogma or doctrine is essentially produced and developed in the Church. It is at first a sense-perception, a feeling ; it is an evidence of spirit that rouses our feelings like a flash of lightning. But that determination of producing or developing is in itself but a one-sided determination or predication, for truth has also existence in itself, and it is presupposed ; the subject is already comprised in the content.

The doctrine or dogma has therefore been made essentially in the Church, and in this process the thinking power, the educated consciousness, asserts its claims, and all that it has elsewhere gained for the education of its thoughts and in regard to philosophy it uses for this thought and in behalf of the truth which is thus known. It forms the dogma or doctrine out of another content which is concrete, and still alloyed with impurities.

This existing doctrine must then be preserved in the Church, and what exists as a dogma must, of course, be taught. In order to remove it from the contingencies of opinion and [individual] judgment, and to preserve it as a truth which is in and for itself and fixed, it is laid down in the form of symbols. It *is*, exists, is valid, is acknowledged, is immediate, but not in a sensuous mode, as if it were to be conceived through the senses as we conceive the world, for instance, which is a presupposition to which, as to a sensuous thing, we stand in an external relationship.

The spiritual truth exists only as a known truth ; its mode of external appearance is that it is taught. The existence of a body of teachers whose office it is to teach and proclaim this doctrine is an essential institution of the Church.

The subject is born into this doctrine ; its beginning is surrounded by this state of valid existing truth, and by the consciousness of the same. This is the subject's relation to this truth which exists, and is presupposed in and for itself.

2. The individual thus born into the Church is at the same time destined to take part—although unconsciously—in this truth, to be a sharer of its benefits ; the subject is destined for this truth. The Church expresses this in the sacrament of baptism ; man is

within the communion of the Church in which the evil is conquered in and for itself, and God is in and for himself reconciled.

Baptism indicates that the child is born in the communion of the Church, and not in lonely misery ; that he will not find a hostile world, but that the Church is his world, and that he must grow up in harmony with the communion [of believers] wherein he is to find his place and condition.

Man must be born twice ; once naturally, and, secondly, spiritually, like the Brahmin. Spirit has no immediate existence ; it exists as it gives birth to itself out of itself ; it exists only as the regenerated.

This regeneration is no longer the infinite sorrow which is the labor and pain at the birth of the communion of worshippers ; the subject cannot be spared the infinite real pain, but it is alleviated. For there still exists the contest of particularity, of the special interests of passions and selfishness. The natural heart which still holds sway over man is the enemy against whom he must struggle, but this is no longer the real struggle out of which the communion of worshippers arose.

To the special individual the doctrine or dogma stands in the relation of something external. The child is as yet spirit in itself only ; he is not yet realized spirit, he is not real as spirit ; he has but the possibility or power to be spirit, or to realize himself as spirit. Thus, the truth approaches him first as something presupposed, as something recognized and valid ; that is to say, truth approaches man first in the form of authority.

All truth—including the sensuous, although it is not truth in the proper sense—obtains with man first in that manner. In our sensuous perception the world thus approaches us in the form of Authority. It exists, we find it as such, we perceive it as an independently existing thing, and our attitude towards it is that towards an independent thing. It is what it is : and as it is, so is it valued.

The doctrine, or dogma, which is the spiritual element does not exist as such a sensuous authority, but must be taught as a valid truth. Morality, or the ethical element, has permanent validity ; it is an existing conviction ; but because it is of spiritual nature we do not say it exists, but it is valid, or is binding. But since it first appears to us as an Existence—it is—and because it appears to us

as something that is valid and has sway, we call this manner of existence Authority.

Man learns the presence of sensuous things by authority; since they are there, since they exist, he must submit to the fact. Thus, the sun is there, and, since it is there, I must submit to the fact. Thus [it is] also [with] the doctrine, with the truth; but the latter comes to our notice not through sensuous perception, through the activity of our senses, but we receive it by being taught its existence; we receive it through authority. Whatever is in the human spirit—that is to say, what is in his true spirit—appears in man's consciousness as an objective thing; or, what is in man's mind is developed, so that he knows it as the truth in which he lives. The important point in such education, practice, training, and acquisition, is the forming of a habitual attachment to the Good and the True. The object in this respect is here not the conquering of the Evil, for the Evil is already conquered in and for itself. The question here is simply that of contingent subjectivity. With that one proposition of faith, that the subject is not what it ought to be, there is connected at the same time the absolute possibility that it may fulfil its destination and may be received into the grace of God. This is a matter of faith. The individual must seize the potential unity of the divine and human natures, and this unity he seizes in the belief in Christ. God is then no longer [merely] an externality for them, and the seizing of this truth is the contradiction of that fundamental proposition—namely, that the subject is not as he ought to be. The child, since it is born within the pale of a church, is born in freedom and for freedom; there is no longer any absolute alienation for it, since this alienation is posited as overcome and conquered.

In this process of educational adaptation the aim is not to allow the Evil—for which there is generally a possibility in man—to arise in him; but, since the Evil arises when man does wrong, the latter exists thereby as something that is nugatory in itself, and over which spirit has power, in such a manner that spirit has power to undo the Evil [and cancel it].

The meaning of repentance, atonement, is, that by man's elevation to the truth crime is cognized as something conquered, which has no power in itself. The deed cannot be made undone in a

sensuous manner, but spiritually, internally. He is forgiven; men know him as one whom the Father has received.

This is the office of the Church, to so accustom man that the education of the spirit becomes more and more internal, and that the truth becomes more and more identical with his Self, with man's will, and that it may become his own will, his own spirit. The struggle is over, and the consciousness has arisen that it is no struggle like the one portrayed in the Persian religion, or in Kant's philosophy, where it is demanded that the Evil should be conquered, but where Evil abides eternally in and for itself opposed to the Good, and where an infinite progression is the highest principle.

Where no further progress is made than to reach a "categorical imperative," there the struggle and endeavor are infinite, the solution of the problem is infinitely deferred.

Here, on the contrary, the problem is solved in itself; the Evil is cognized in spirit as conquered in and for itself, and, on account of this conquest, the subject has but to make his will pure and good, and the Evil, the bad deed, has disappeared.

At this stage arises the consciousness that, when the natural will is given up, there is no sin which cannot be forgiven—except the sin against the Holy Ghost, the denial or negation of the spirit; for the latter alone is the power which can annul all [Evil].

There are many difficulties in this which arise out of the idea of Spirit and Freedom; there is on the one side spirit as universal spirit, and on the other the existence of independent individual men. This, then, must be said: it is the divine spirit which causes that man is born again; this is divinely free grace, for all that is divine is free; it is neither fate nor destiny. Then, again, the individual existence of the soul is a fixed fact, and in this connection some have tried to discover how much [of this attribute of freedom] belongs to man. They ascribe to him a *Velleitas*, a *Nisus*, but to look upon this relation as a fixed and final stage would be in itself unspiritual. The first being, the selfhood, is the idea potentially, the potential spirit; and what must be annulled is the form of its immediateness, or its isolated, particular independence. This self-annulment or return-movement of the idea is, however, unlimited, universal spirit. Action and life in the faith of a potential reconciliation is, on the one side, the

subject's doing; but, on the other side, it is the doing of the divine spirit. Faith itself is the divine spirit which is active in the subject. Not that the latter is a mere passive vessel; on the contrary, the Holy Spirit is also the subject's own spirit, inasmuch as the subject has faith. In this faith he acts against his naturalness, and strips it off and casts it away.

To explain the antinomy which lies in this path of the soul, reference may be made to the differences between the three conceptions that have arisen in regard to it.

(1) The first is the Moral View, which finds its contrast in the quite external relationship of our self-consciousness (a relation which, taken by itself, would occupy the fourth or first place), namely, in the Oriental and despotic relation of the annihilation of the individual's own thinking and volition. This Moral View places the absolute end and purpose of the spirit, or the essence of spirit, in a purpose of volition—namely, in volition as his own volition, so that this subjective side is the principal thing. The law, the universal, the rational, is my rationality within me. In the same way the willing and the realization, which make it my own and render it my subjective aim and end, are mine; and since there enters into this view the idea also of something higher, of the Highest, of God, and of the Divine, these themselves are but postulates of my reason; they are what I myself have posited. It is true, on the other hand, that these should be things that are not posited, that form the strictly independent power; in this predicate, "not posited," I do not forget that this "not posited" is posited by me. It makes no difference whether this is expressed in the form of a postulate, or whether we express it by saying, My feeling of dependence, of my need to be saved, is the first thing; in either form the objectivity proper to truth is annulled.

(2) From the stand-point of Piety this view is modified by adding, in regard to the determining volition and in regard to the universal or the law, that all these are [the emanations of] the divine will, and that the power of a good resolution is in itself something divine; and with this general relation it lets the matter rest.

(3) The mystic view, finally, or that of the Church, defines this connection of God with the subjective volition more closely, and

establishes a relation between them which is based on the nature of the Idea. The representations of this in the several churches are but diverse attempts to solve this antinomy. The Lutheran conception is, without doubt, the most ingenious, although it, as well as the others, does not fully attain the form of the idea.

3. The last [principle] in this sphere is the enjoyment of this assimilation [of the subjective will by the divine and] of the presence of God. We have arrived at the stand-point of the conscious presence of God, of unity with God, of the *unio mystica*, the feeling of the unity of the self with God.¹

This is the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which there is given to man, in a sensuous, immediate manner, the consciousness of his reconciliation with God, and of the entrance of the spirit into his soul, and of its abode there.

Inasmuch as this is a feeling—of which our Self is the object—it is also a movement; it presupposes the removal of differences in order to produce this negative unity. While, on the one hand, the constant preservation of the Church (which is at the same time the uninterrupted creation of the same) is the perpetual repetition of the life, sufferings, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the Church, this repetition is, on the other hand, explicitly performed in the sacrament of the Eucharist. The perpetual sacrifice in it is that the absolute content, the unity of the subject and of the absolute object, is offered to the individual for his immediate participation and enjoyment, and when the individual is reconciled, then this perfect reconciliation is the resurrection of Christ. For this reason the Eucharist is the central point of the doctrine of Christianity, and from this point all the differences in the Christian Church receive their color and distinguishing characteristic. There are three conceptions in regard to it.

1. According to the one concept, the host, this external object, this sensuous, unspiritual thing, becomes by consecration the present God—God [conceived] as a thing, in the manner of an empirical thing, and just as empirically participated in and taken by man. Thus is God known in the Lord's supper, in this central

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—The feeling of the connection of man's own deeds with the spirit in man, and through the latter with God.

point of the doctrine, as an external thing, and this externality is the basis of the whole of the Catholic religion. Thus the bondage in thought and action arises, [for] this externality affects all further developments, since the True is conceived as a fixed and external thing. Since it thus exists outside of the subject, it may be subjected to the power of others; the Church holds possession of it as well as of all the other means of grace. The subject is conceived in every respect as passive and recipient, as not knowing what is true, right, and good, and as bound, therefore, to receive and accept it from others.

2. The Lutheran conception is that the movement begins with something external, which is an ordinary, common thing; but that the participation in and the self-experience of the presence of God is brought about inasmuch and in so far only as this externality is consumed, not only physically, but in spirit and faith. In spirit and faith alone there is the present God. The sensuous presence, by itself, is nothing, and even the consecration does not render the host an object of worship; the object exists in the faith alone, and thus there is in the eating and the annihilation of the sensuous the union with God, and the consciousness of this union of the subject with God. Here the grand consciousness has arisen that outside of the participation and the faith the host is an ordinary, sensuous thing; in spirit alone the process has its truth.

There is no transubstantiation [in an external sense], yet there is a transubstantiation indeed [in another sense], but it is one by which the external is annulled and the presence of God is strictly a spiritual one, in such a way that the faith of the subject is its necessary condition.

3. There is [also] the conception that the present God exists in concept only, in the recollection, and that for this reason recollection alone can be said to have immediate subjective presence. This is the conception in the Reformed Church;¹ it is a non-spiritual, but simply vivid, recollection of the past; it is not divine presence, no real spirituality. Here the divine, the truth, has fallen down to the level of prosy rationalism (*Aufklaerung*) and of the one-sided Understanding; it is a merely moral relation.

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—The Reformed Church, "*Reformirte Kirche*," is the name given in Germany to the church which is based on the views of Calvin and Zwingli.

(c) The actualization of the spiritual into universal reality. This contains at the same time the transformation or the re-formation of the Church.

Religion is spiritual, and the Church exists first within, in spirit as such. This internal element, this subjectivity (which is present to itself and considered as internal, not developed in itself), is feeling, sentiment; the Church possesses essentially consciousness, conception, needs, impulses, worldly existence in general—but with these separation and differentiation appear: the divine, objective idea presents itself to consciousness as an Other, as something alien, which is partly given by authority, and partly is made man's own by pious worship. Or the phase of participation [of the Lord's supper] is but a single phase; that is to say, the divine idea, the divine content, is not viewed really, but is simply a matter of image-conception. The moment of communion loses itself in image-conception and flows over partly into a Beyond, a heaven beyond, partly in the past, and partly in the future. Spirit, however, is strictly present to itself, and demands a filled and complete presence; it demands more than simply love and misty image-conceptions; it demands that the content itself be present, or that the feeling, the sensation, be developed and expanded.

Thus, the Church, as kingdom of God, faces an objectivity in general. Objectivity, as the external, immediate world, is the heart; another objectivity is that of Reflection, or of abstract Thought or Understanding, and the third true objectivity is that of the idea; it now remains to be considered how spirit realizes itself in these three elements.

1. In religion in itself the heart is reconciled; reconciliation is thus in the heart, and is spiritual—the pure heart which attains this participation in and enjoyment of the presence of God in itself, and with it attains reconciliation, the enjoyment or satisfaction of being reconciled. This reconciliation, however, is abstract; since the Self, the subject, is at the same time that side of this spiritual presence in which there is a developed worldliness or externality, and the kingdom of God, the Church, has, therefore, a relation to worldliness.

In order that reconciliation be actual, it is necessary that reconciliation be known in, exist in, and be produced in this develop-

ment, in this totality. The principles for this worldliness exist in this spiritual element.

The Spiritual, to speak more particularly, is the truth [*i. e.*, its true purpose] of worldliness, because the subject as such, as the object of divine grace and mercy, and as a being reconciled with God, has infinite value; this is in accordance with its [ideal] destination, which finds fulfilment in the Church. According to this destination, the subject is known as the infinite self-certitude of spirit, as the eternity of spirit.

The nature of this subject, which is thus infinite in itself [it is determined as infinity, and that implies its freedom], is, that it is a free person, and it therefore stands related to the world and reality as subjectivity which is in itself, is reconciled within itself, and is permanent and infinite. This is what is substantial, and this, its determination, must be the basis of its relation to the world.

The rationality and freedom of the subject lie in the fact that it is the subject which has been liberated, which has attained freedom through religion, and that, according to its religious characteristic or determination, it is essentially free. It is necessary that this reconciliation should come to pass in the world itself.

(1). The first form of the reconciliation is the immediate, and for that reason not yet true, mode of reconciliation. The form in which this reconciliation primarily appears is, that, in the first place, the Church contains in itself the reconciliation, the spiritual, this reconciliation with God, as an abstraction from the world; [in this] the spiritual renounces worldliness, and places itself in a negative relation to the world, and thereby to itself also; for the world in the subject is the impulse towards the natural, towards social life, to art and science.

The concrete element in man's Self, the passions cannot be justified when confronted with religion by saying that they are natural; but the monkish abstraction holds this view: that the heart should not be developed into this concreteness, should remain an undeveloped thing; or, that spirituality, reconciliation, and life for this reconciliation, should be concentrated in itself and undeveloped, and remain so. But it is the essence of spirit to develop itself and to differentiate itself, even unto worldliness.

(2). The second form of this reconciliation is, that the world and

religion are to remain external to each other, and yet to assume a mutual relationship. The relationship in which the two stand to each other can therefore be but external, and of such a nature that the one rules over the other, and reconciliation does not exist. The religious element must be the ruling, the reconciled factor; the Church is to rule over the worldly element that remains unreconciled.

It is a union with worldliness which is unreconciled; it is worldliness crude [*i. e.*, "carnal," unspiritual] in itself, which, on account of being crude in itself, is ruled over; but that which is ruling absorbs this worldliness into itself. All inclinations, all the passions, and whatever unspiritual worldliness exists, appear in the Church on account of this dominion and rule, because the worldly element is not reconciled in and of itself.

This is, then, a dominion and rule posited on account of the unspiritual element, in which externality is the principle, and in which man is in his relationship outside of himself [*i. e.*, his true nature, reason, seems an external force constraining him]; it is the relation of dependence, of being unfree in general. Into whatever is human, into all impulses, into all relations to the family, into action and political life, this diremption is introduced, and the self-alienation or self-estrangement of man is the principle.

Man, in all these forms, is in general bondage, and all these forms are considered nugatory and unholy. Since man is encompassed by them, he is in respect to them essentially in the condition of finitude and diremption; that which has no abiding value surrounds him, and the truly valid is elsewhere.

This reconciliation with the world presents itself to the heart of man in such a manner that this reconciliation becomes the very opposite. The further examination of this diremption within reconciliation itself shows it to be that which appears as the corruption of the Church—the absolute contradiction of the spiritual within itself.

(3). The third consideration is, that this contradiction is dissolved in the idea of Morality, that the idea of freedom has found its way into reality, and, when the reality is formed according to the idea, according to reason, to truth, to eternal truth, it is Freedom grown concrete, it is rational will.

It is in the organization of the state that the divine forms the

woof to the warp of reality, where the one is interpenetrated by the other, and where the worldly element is justified in and for itself. For the principle of the organization of the state is the divine will, the law of justice and of freedom. True reconciliation, by which the divine actualizes itself in the sphere of reality, is found in the laws and the ethical life of the state; this is the truly transforming discipline [*subaction*] of worldliness.

The ethical institutions are divine and holy, not in the sense in which holy is opposed to the ethical, as celibacy, for instance, is represented as the holy state when compared with marriage and the love of family, or when voluntary poverty is contrasted with active self-interested thrift or lawful gain; in the same way blind obedience is considered a holy and sacred object. But the really and truly ethical is found in obedience, in freedom, rational will, obedience of the subject to the ethical. In ethical [life] the reconciliation of religion with reality or worldliness exists and is completed.

2. The second is, that the ideal side in this now becomes prominent by itself. In this reconciliation of the spirit with itself, the internal [nature of man] cognizes itself as self-contained, as being in itself; and this knowledge of being within one's self, or of being self-contained, is that Thinking which is reconciliation, self-contained being, being-in-peace-with one's self — but this peace is quite abstract and undeveloped. Thus, there arises the infinite behest [or postulate] that the content of religion should stand the test of thought also, and this necessity cannot be obviated.

Thinking is the universal; it is the activity of the universal, and stands in a contrast with the concrete in general as well as with the external. It is the freedom of reason which has been obtained in religion, and which now knows itself for itself in spirit. This freedom now turns against the merely spiritless externality, against bondage; for bondage is directly opposed to the idea of reconciliation or liberation, and thus the thinking makes its appearance which defies and destroys externality, no matter in what form it appears.

This is the negative and formal movement which has been called in its concrete shape Rationalism (*Aufklaerung*), and in which thinking turns against externality, and the freedom of the

spirit which lies in reconciliation is asserted. This thinking, when it first originates, arises as this abstractly Universal, and is directed against the concrete in general, and therewith, also, against the idea of God—against the view which holds that God is not a dead abstraction, but the Trinity; that he is self-related, that he is within himself and returns to himself. Abstract thinking through its principle of identity attacks this content of the Church: for that concrete content stands in contradiction to the principle of identity. In the concrete there are determinations and distinctions; since abstract thinking turns against externality in general, it turns against the difference as such, against the relation of God to man, against the unity of the two, against divine grace and human liberty—all these involve the unity of opposite categories. But the understanding, abstract thinking, takes abstract identity for its highest principle; this kind of thinking proceeds to dissolve all that is concrete, all determinations, all the content which is in God. Thus, reflection has for its last result nothing but the objectivity of identity itself [or, in other words], this [view]: that God is naught but the Supreme Being, without determination, and empty. For every determination renders a being concrete. He is for cognition a something transcendent [“unknowable”], because cognition [“the knowable”] means the knowledge of a concrete content [*i. e.*, a being with attributes]. This extreme result of reflection reaches a principle exactly opposite to that of the Christian Church; by it all that is concrete in God is cancelled. It may, perhaps, thus be expressed: It is impossible [to cognize God, for to cognize God means to know God in his determinations [*i. e.*, to limit him]; he should remain, however, according to the principle of Reflection, pure abstraction. In this formalism, it is true, the principle of freedom, of internality, of religion itself, has been conceived, but as yet only abstractly.

The other element through which, in this abstraction, determinateness enters into this universality is naught else but what lies in the natural inclinations and impulses of the subject. From this stand-point it is then asserted: Man is good by nature. Since this pure subjectivity or ideality is pure freedom, it adheres to the category or determination of the Good, but the Good itself must also remain here an abstraction.

The Good is determined here as Arbitrariness, as the general contingency of the subject; and thus the highest principle of this subjectivity, or freedom, which renounces the truth, and produces and knows within itself the development of truth, is, that what it acknowledges as valid are but its own determinations, and that it is master over that which is good and evil.

This is an inner moving and stirring, which may just as easily be hypocrisy or the merest vanity as it may be quiet, noble, and pious endeavors. It is the world of pious feelings to which Pietism¹ confines and limits itself. Pietism does not recognize any objective truth, and, although it retains a mediation, a relation to Christ, it makes this relation remain within the feeling, in the inner sentiment. There everybody has *his* God, *his* Christ, etc. It is true that [a certain] particularity, in which each person has his individual religion and view of the world, exists in man; but in religion, by the life of the Church, it is consumed, and has no longer any validity for the truly pious man, and is put aside.

Over against the empty essence of God there stands thus the finitude which is free for itself, and has become self-dependent, which in itself is considered absolute (as probity of the individuals, for instance). The further inference is that not only the objectivity of God is thus transcendent and inaccessible, and is thus negated, but that the other determinations also, which are valid in and for themselves, and which are posited in the world in the form of rights, etc., disappear and vanish. When the subject withdraws to the height of his infinity, the Good and the Just have existence only within himself; it reduces them all to his subjective determination; they are but *his* thought. The realization of this Good is then to result from natural arbitrariness, contingency, passion, etc. This subject is then the consciousness [which imagines] that objectivity is comprehended within the subject itself, and has no fixed existence; it considers nothing valid but the principle of identity alone. This subject is the abstract one; it can be filled with any content whatsoever; it is capable of subsuming any content which is thus planted in

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Pietism is the name given in Germany to a religious view which began to manifest itself there during the latter part of the seventeenth century; it attached less importance to doctrinal differences, and more to fervid religious feelings and good works.

the heart of man. Subjectivity is thus arbitrariness itself, and the knowledge of its power is strictly that it produces Objectivity or the Good, and gives to it a content.

The other development of this stand-point is, that the subject, compared with the unity into which it has poured itself, has no independent existence, and does not retain its particularity, but that it gives to itself the determination of sinking itself into the unity of God. Thus, then, the subject has neither a particular nor an objective aim and end, except that of the honor of the One God. This form is religion; in it there is an affirmative relation to the subject's essence, which is this One, and the subject relinquishes itself therein. This religion has the same objective content as the Jewish religion, but man's relation is widened; he retains no particularity. The Jewish national privilege [as the chosen people] is here wanting which posits this relation to One; here there is no limitation; man is related to this One as pure abstract self-consciousness. This is the attitude of the Mohammedan religion. In it Christianity finds its opposite, because the Mohammedan stands in the same sphere [*i. e.*, as contraries belong to the same unity] with the Christian religion. Like the Jewish religion, it is spiritual; but this God exists for self-consciousness in the abstract, cognizing spirit only, and it stands in so far on the same level with the Christian religion as there is no particularity retained. Whoever fears God pleases him, and man has value in so far only as he places his truth in the cognition that He is the One, the Essence. No barrier of any kind between the believers and each other, or between them and God, is acknowledged. Before God, the determinations of the subject in regard to rank or position are annulled; the subjects may be of rank, or they may be slaves; but this is accidental only.

The contrast between Christianity and Mohammedanism is, that in Christ spirituality is concretely developed, and that it is known as triune, *i. e.*, as spirit, and that the history of man, the relation to the One, is concrete history; that it has its beginning in natural will, and this natural will is not as it ought to be [*i. e.*, it is fallen, corrupt]; the renunciation of this [natural will], or that by which it becomes its [real] self, takes place through the negation of itself for the sake of this its essence. The Moham-

medan hates and banishes everything concrete. God is the absolutely One, and this implies that man retains for himself no aim and end, no particularity, no peculiarity. Existing man indeed particularizes himself in his inclinations, his interests, and these are here all the more wild and unrestrained because they lack Reflection; but with this the complete contrast is posited as well, namely, the giving up of everything, indifference to every aim and end, absolute fatalism, indifference towards life; no practical aim has essential validity. But since man is also practical and active, the aim and end can solely be to produce in all men worship and reverence of the One; the Mohammedan religion is therefore essentially fanatic.

The reflection which we have considered stands on the same level with Mohammedanism, [since it asserts] that God has no content, that he is not concrete. God's manifestation in the flesh, the elevation of Christ as the Son of God, the transfiguration of the finitude of the world and of the self-consciousness into the infinite self-consciousness of God are all wanting here. Christianity is looked upon [by this abstract view] only as a doctrine or dogma, and Christ as a messenger of God, as a divine teacher—that is to say, as a teacher like Socrates, but of superior rank, since he was without sin. But this is only a superficial view. Either Christ was nothing but a man, or he was “the Son of Man.” Of the divine history nothing remains [if this superficial view is adopted], and, if Christ is spoken of in the style of the Koran, the whole difference between this stage and that of Mohammedanism is, that the latter—whose view bathes itself in the ether of the limitless—is the infinite independence which renounces all particularity, all pleasure, rank, all individual knowledge, and all vanity. The stand-point which rationalism, the view of the understanding, holds is, that God is considered as something distant, as something transcendent [“jenseits,” “beyond,” *i. e.*, beyond the limits of the knowable], and as having no affirmative relation to the subject. This view, therefore, considers man as being abstractly for himself, and as having recognized the affirmative Universal as far only as it is in him, but that he has it within himself abstractly only, and therefore bases the accomplishment and fulfilment of it on contingency and arbitrariness only.

But even in this last form we are able to recognize a reconciliation, and this last phenomenon is therefore equally a realization of faith. For, since all content, all truth, have been spoiled in this subjectivity (which, knowing itself infinite, is particular), the consciousness of the principle of subjective freedom arises therein. That which in the Church is called the Internal is now developed into completeness in itself; it is not only the internal or conscience, but it is subjectivity which makes itself subject and object, which distinguishes itself and is concrete; it exists as its [own] objectivity, which knows the universal to be in itself and which produces it out of itself. It is the subjectivity which is for itself and determined in itself; it is the completion by which the subjective extreme becomes the idea-in-itself. The defect therein is, that it is formal only, and lacks true objectivity; it is the last point of formal culture that still lacks necessity in itself. The true completion of the idea requires that the objectivity should be set free [made objectively independent], and that it be the totality of objectivity in itself!

The result of this objectivity, therefore, is, that in the subject everything is misty and distorted, without objectivity, without fixed determinateness, without the development of God. This last climax of the formal culture of our time is at the same time the extreme of coarseness [or crudeness of insight], since it possesses the form only of culture.

In the preceding we have considered scientifically these two elements in opposition to each other in the development of the Church. The one was the lack of freedom, bondage of the spirit [even] in the absolute region of freedom. The other was abstract subjectivity, subjective freedom without a content.

3. What remains to be considered is, that subjectivity develops out of itself the content (but in a manner which proceeds according to necessity), and knows and acknowledges the content as necessary, as objective, and as being in-and-for itself. This is the stand-point of philosophy, that the content takes refuge in the idea, and, through thinking, receives its rehabilitation and justification.

Thinking is not merely this act of abstracting and determining according to the law of identity; this mode of thinking is itself essentially concrete, and therefore it is comprehension; its

nature is, that conception determines itself to its totality, the idea.

It is self-existing free reason which develops and justifies in knowledge the content of truth, which acknowledges and cognizes a truth. The purely subjective stand-point, the evaporation of all content, the rationalism of the understanding, and [the doctrine of] Pietism, as well acknowledge no content, and, therefore, no truth.

The idea, however, produces the truth—that is, the subjective freedom—but it acknowledges, at the same time, this content to be not produced, but to be a truth which has existence in and for itself. This objective stand-point alone is able to pronounce and give the testimony of spirit in a cultured and thinking manner, and is contained in the better class of dogmatism of our times.

This stand-point is therefore that of the justification of religion, especially of the Christian and true religion. It cognizes the content according to its necessity, according to its reason, and, in the same way, it cognizes the forms in the development of this content. We have inspected these forms, namely: the phenomenal manifestation of God, this image-conception for the sensuous, spiritual consciousness which has attained universality or thought, this complete development of the spirit.

In justifying the content and cognizing the forms, the determinateness of the phenomenon, Thinking also recognizes the limits of the forms. Rationalism knows naught but the negation, the limit, the determination as such, and it therefore wrongs the strict content.

The form, the determination, is not merely finitude, it is not merely limit, but the form, as totality of form, is itself the idea, and these forms are necessary and essential.

Since reflection has broken into religion, thinking or reflection occupies a hostile position towards image-conception in religion, and towards the concrete content. Thinking, that has thus commenced, never rests; it persists and renders the heart, heaven, and the cognizing spirit empty and void, and the religious content then takes refuge in the idea. Here it must receive its justification, and thinking must conceive itself as concrete and free; it must hold the differences not simply as posited and given, but it must let them go free, and thereby recognize the content as objective.

Philosophy has for its function to establish the relation to the two preceding stages. Religion, or the pious impulse of our nature, may take refuge in emotion instead of in the idea, in the sentiment which resigns itself to the giving up of the truth, which renounces the knowledge of the content; so that the holy Church has thus no longer a communion, and collapses into atoms. For communion is found in the dogma or doctrine; but each individual has his own sentiment, own emotions, and a particular view of the world. This form does not answer to spirit, which wishes to know its position. Thus, philosophy has two contrasts or antitheses. On the one side it seems to be in contrast with the Church; it has this in common with culture, with reflection, that, when it is in the process of conceiving, it does not stop with the form of the image-concept, but must conceive in thought, and must cognize through this the form of image-conception as necessary. But the idea is the higher stage which comprehends the distinct forms and does justice to them. The second contrast is that with rationalism [*Aufklaerung*], with the indifference of content, with [the mere] opinion, with the despairing renunciation of truth. Philosophy has for its aim the cognition of truth, the cognition of God, for he is the absolute truth; in this respect nothing is worth while, compared with God and his explication. Philosophy cognizes God essentially as concrete, as spiritual and real universality, which is not envious, but communicates or imparts itself to others. Light itself communicates itself, and allows itself to be shared. Whoever says that God cannot be cognized, says that God is envious, and he is not in earnest in believing in God, no matter how much he talks about Him. Rationalism, this vanity of the understanding, is the most violent opponent of philosophy; it takes it amiss when philosophy demonstrates the presence of reason in Christian religion, when it shows that the testimony of spirit of truth is deposited in religion. In philosophy, which is theology, the whole object is to show reason in religion.

In philosophy, religion finds its justification from the stand-point of thinking consciousness. Unsophisticated piety has no need of this; it receives truth as authority, and finds satisfaction and reconciliation by means of this truth.

In faith there is already the true content, but it still lacks the

form of thinking. All forms which we have examined hitherto—feeling, image-conception—may have the content of truth, but they themselves are not the true form which makes the true content necessary. Thinking is the absolute judge before whom the content must prove and justify itself.

Philosophy has been charged with placing itself above religion; but this is false according to the fact itself, for philosophy has only this and no other content, but it gives it in the form of thinking; in this manner it places itself above the form of faith, but the content is the same.

The form of the subject—as a feeling individual, etc.—concerns the subject as an individual; but feeling, as such, is not excluded from philosophy. The question is only whether the content of the feeling be the truth, whether it can prove itself as such before Thought. Philosophy thinks what the subject as such feels, and leaves it to arrive at an understanding with his feelings. Feeling is not rejected by philosophy, but the latter gives to it rather the true content.

But, since thinking begins to place itself in a contrast with the concrete, the process of thinking must go through this stage of opposition until it arrives at reconciliation. This reconciliation is philosophy; in this respect philosophy is theology; it represents the reconciliation of God with himself and with nature; it represents that nature, which is alienation, is in-itself divine, and that the nature of the finite spirit in-itself is, partly, to elevate itself to this reconciliation, and partly attains this reconciliation in the course of the history of the world.

This religious cognition through the idea is, in consequence of its nature, not general; it is again simply cognition within the Church, and thus in regard to the kingdom of the spirit three stages or classes are formed: The first class, that of immediate, unsophisticated religion and faith; the second, the class of the understanding—of the so-called cultured or educated people—that of reflection and rationalism; and, finally, the third class, the stage of philosophy.

When, after having considered its rise and existence, we see the realization of the Church in its spiritual actuality lapse into this internal conflict and division, this realization appears to us to be at the same time its decadence. But can we here speak of a

downfall when the realm of God is established forever, and the Holy Ghost, as such, lives eternally in its communion [of believers—the Church], and the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church? To speak of decadence would mean to wind up with a discord.

But what does it avail? The discord exists in reality. As it was at the time of the Roman Empire—when (because the general unity of religion had disappeared and the Divine was profaned, and the general political life lacked counsel, action, and confidence) reason took refuge in the forms of civil rights, or, because that which has existence in and for itself had been given up, the individual weal was made a purpose and an aim—in the same way at the present time, when the merely moral view, the individual opinion and conviction without objective truth, has made itself the ruling power, the rage for private or individual rights and pleasure has become the order of the day. When the fulness of time is come, and the justification through the idea has become a want and a necessity, then the unity of the internal and the external no longer exists in immediate consciousness, and in reality, and then there is nothing in faith that is justified. The rigor of an objective order, external compulsion, the power of the state, are here of no avail; the decay has eaten its way too deep for that. When the Gospel is no longer preached to the poor, when the salt has lost its savor, and every fixed foundation has been tacitly removed, then the people—whose understanding always remains undeveloped, and for whom truth can exist in image-conception only—no longer know how to satisfy the impulse of their inner nature. They are least removed from the infinite pain; but since the love is perverted to a love or to pleasures which are free from all pain, the people see themselves forsaken by their teachers; the latter have helped themselves through reflection, and have found satisfaction in finitude, in subjectivity and its arts, and thereby in vanity; but that substantial mass of the people cannot find its own satisfaction in this.

This discord has been dissolved for us by philosophy, and the object of these lectures has been to reconcile reason with religion, to cognize the latter in its various shapes as necessary, and again to find in revealed religion the Truth and the Idea. But this reconciliation is itself but a partial one, without external univer-

ality ; philosophy is in this respect a secluded sanctuary, and its servants form an isolated priesthood which cannot walk the paths of the world, and which must guard the treasure of truth. How the temporal, empirical present finds its way out of its dividing quandary, how it will shape itself, must be left to it, and is not the immediately practical cause and concern of philosophy.

[END OF THE WORK.]

A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF MIND.¹

BY JAMES WARD.

I.

Many admirable works have been written purporting to furnish analyses of mind ; but almost all of them, in common with other works on psychology, proceed at once to the examination of special facts, such as Sensations, their authors apparently considering it unnecessary to discuss at any length the relation of the several elements of mind to each other. While cognitions are under discussion, emotions are out of view, and volitions in their turn are treated regardless of both ; so that though the special analyses and descriptions are excellent, the *tout ensemble* of mind is never exhibited at all : we lose sight of the wood among the trees. The reason of this is not far to seek. First, in most states of mind as we know them some one aspect or element is prominent, the rest being obscure or of secondary interest. Hence, in common language, and very generally in psychology too, these obvious and obtrusive differences between one state and another have been regarded as concrete mental states, instead of being in reality only abstractions. "The mind can seldom operate exclusively in one of these three modes," says Mr. Bain, referring to his own "classification of mind." "A feeling is apt to be accompanied more or less by will and by thought."² Sir W. Hamilton is even more explicit : "In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and cona-

¹ Discussed October 15, 1880, at the Moral Sciences Club, at the rooms of Mr. James Ward, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, England.

² "Mental Science," p. 2.